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From the above short discussion, it would seem fair to state that plaintiff is
entitled to injunctive relief against defendant. To this end Plaintiff Schwartz has
filed a Petition for Rehearing, dated July 9, 1954, but the outcome has not yet
been determined. Thus, there is still a hope that the court will ultimately admit
the correctness of plaintiff's position. However, if this decision stands, the future
of trade-names and trade-marks in California appears dim.
Olile M. Marke-Victoire
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. DENIAL oF DuE PROCESS-POWER OF SUPREME
COURT To REVIEW CONVICTIONS OBTAINED BY THE ADMISSION OF ALLEGEDLY
COERCED CONFESSIONS.
Since 1936 many state criminal convictions involving the admission of alleg-
edly coerced confessions have come before the United States Supreme Court.'
These cases have produced much disagreement among the members of the Court
and a good deal of law review comment.2 With the exception of cases involving
confessions obtained by severe physical or mental torture, the Court has been
sharply divided in its decisions.
The case of Leyra v. Denno,3 decided on June 1, 1954, illustrates this conflict
of opinion. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a New York conviction by a
five to three decision. The accused, charged with murdering his parents, was ques-
tioned by police intermittently for two days and deprived of sleep. He confessed
after being interrogated for an hour and a half by a skilled psychiatrist posing as
a physician. Subsequent confessions were made within three and a half hours to
a police captain, Leyra's business partner, and two assistant state prosecutors.
Petitioner's first conviction was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals 4
on the ground that the first confession to the psychiatrist, which was admitted in
evidence at the trial, had been coerced and was violative of the due process clause
of the Federal Constitution. 5 The Court remanded the case to the trial court with
directions to submit the question of coersion of the later confessions to the jury.
The first confession was not offered in evidence and the later ones were found to
be voluntary. This conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals,8 two justices
dissenting. The court held there was evidence to support a finding that the sub-
sequent confessions were free from the coercive influences of the first, made to the
psychiatrist. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.7 Petitioner then
filed habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court. It denied the
I See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949),
Chambers v. Flonda, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
2 See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 NORTHwESTERN
U. L. REV. 16 (1953) ; Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Proceedings
-'Ordered Liberty' or 'Just Deserts,' 41 CAn.E. L. Rmv. 672 (1953), Inbar, The Confession
Dilemma in the U. S. Supreme Court, 43 IL. L. REv. 442 (1948) ; Comment, 50 MicH. L. REv.
567 (1952).
3 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
4 People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
5 U. S. CoNsT. A. Nm. XIV, § 1. ".. nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ..."
6 People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673 (1952).
7 Leyra v. New York, 345 U.S. 918 (1952).
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petition.8 That decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, one judge dissenting.9 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari,10 and in
setting aside the conviction, held the subsequent confessions involuntary as a
matter of law and that use of them to secure a conviction was a violation of the
due process cause. Mr. Justice Black, in the majority opinion, said:
" the undisputed facts m the case are irreconcilable with petitioner's mental free-
dom 'to confess to or deny a suspected participation m a crime' and the relation of
the confessions is 'so close that one must say the facts of one control the character
of the other ' All were simply parts of one continuous process." 11
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton points out that there was evidence
which would support a conclusion that the later confessions were voluntary,
namely, that the confession to Leyra's partner was admittedly voluntary; that
in the opinion of a psychiatrist appearing as a witness for the state, the effect of
the prior coercion was not carried over; that in the opinion of the assistant district
attorneys, to whom the last confession was made, Leyra seemed quite normal and
relaxed and relieved to talk to them.
The principle that the use of a coerced confession in a state criminal trial is
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment has been declared on several occasions
by the Supreme Court. In Brown v. Mississippi,12 confessions were extorted from
ignorant Negro defendants by brutal floggings and threats of mob violence. In
Chambers v. Florida,13 defendants were Negro youths arrested without warrants,
denied access to counsel, family, or friends and interrogated singly for five days
by large groups of white police officers. The convicitions in these cases and in
others,'14 equally shocking, were reversed by unanimous decisions.
The doctrine that the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
the judgments of state criminal trials was first pronounced in 1821 in the case of
Cohens v. Virginia.15 In reviewing such proceedings, where a federal right is in
issue, the Court is not bound by the trier of fact's finding when the record shows
the findings to be without evidence to support ijt.16 Where the evidence as to the
fact in question is conflicting, the Supreme Court will accept the determination
of the jury unless it is so lacking in support as to deprive the accused of the funda-
mental fairness accorded by the due process clause.' It is not the function of the
court, however, to reverse convictions merelyr because the weight of evidence is
against the verdict.1 The Court's function then, is to insure a fair trial but not
to act as a super-jury
The issue then can be stated thus: To what extent should the Supreme Court
exercise its power of review when deciding whether a confession, held by the trier
of fact to be voluntary, is as a matter of law involuntary?
8 Leyra v Denno, 113 F.Supp. 556 (S.D. New York 1953).
9 Leyra v Denno, 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953).
1O Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 926 (1954)
11347 U.S. at 561. Subquotation from Lyons v Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602, 603 (1944).
12 See note 1 supra.
13 See note I supra.
14 Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942), White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
15 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821).
16 Fiske v Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), Ward v Texas, supra note 14.
17Lisenba v California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
18 346 U.S. at 180.
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The extent to which the Court has gone can be demonstrated by examining
cases less clear cut than those discussed above. The case of Lyons v. Oklahoma'9
is similar, on the facts, to the Leyra case. There, a conviction for murder was af-
firmed, two justices dissenting. The report shows that Lyons was questioned for
two hours upon arrest, then held in jail for eleven days; after which time, he was
interrogated by officials for about eight hours before he confessed. The officials
admitted having placed a pan of the victim's bones in Lyons' lap to elicit the
confession. In addition, Lyons' claim of physical abuse was supported by the tes-
timony of disinterested witnesses. After this confession, he was transported to a
state penitentiary in another town. Some twelve hours later he confessed to the
warden. The first confession was admittedly coerced and was not offered in evi-
dence. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the subsequent con-
fession was voluntary depends upon the "inferences as to the continuing effect of
the coercive practices which may fairly be drawn from the surrounding circum-
stances."'20 Furthermore, the triers of fact were to draw these inferences where
the evidence would justify a conclusion that the coercive effects employed had dis-
stpated before the second confession.
In Haley v. Ohio,2 the defendant, a fifteen year old Negro boy, was arrested
about midmght and confessed after being questioned for five hours by relays of
officers. No counsel, friends, or family were present. The boy claimed he was
beaten; but there was much credible testimony to the effect that he was given
very considerate treatment. After confessing, Haley was placed in jail and held
incommunicado for three days. His mother, and a lawyer whom she had retained,
were refused permission to see him; but a news photographer was allowed to take
his photograph just after he confessed. The judge instructed the jury to disregard
the confession if they concluded that it wasn't made of his own free will. They
concluded that it was. The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that the
confession was involuntary and reversed the conviction. A novel aspect of this
case is that the Court based its decision partly upon Haley's ill-treatment follow-
ing his confession by reasoning that such methods were indicative of what the
boy was probably subjected to prior to confessing. Other cases further illustrate the
division of opinion on the Court when considering the admission of confessions.22
It is apparent from these decisions that no definitive basis can be formulated
for determining at what point, despite contrary findings by the trier of fact, the
Supreme Court will declare a confession involuntary The question is one of bal-
ancing the interests between the states' right to conduct their law enforcement
19 See note 11 supra.
2Id. at 602.
21332 U.S. 596 (1948).
22In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), accused confessed after being kept
stripped of his clothing for several hours though questioned only occasionally. Reversed by
five to four decision. In Lisenba v. California, supra note 17, accused was questioned almost
continuously for two days until he fainted, or fell asleep. He was then held in jail for two weeks
and confessed after about 12 hours interrogation. Affirmed by seven to two decision. See also
Stem v. New York, supra note 1, affirmed by six to three decision, and Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181 (1952), and Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), both affirmed by six to two
decisions. For an analysis of the factors considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a con-
fession and a record of how the individual Supreme Court justices have voted on the issue, see
Note, 33 NEB L. REv. 507 (1954).
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programs and the Supreme Court's duty to maintain those safeguards to life and
liberty traditionally afforded by the constitution.
Two aspects of policy should be considered in this connection. First, a funda-
mental reason for a trial by jury lies in the fact that the jury sees and hears the
witnesses, examines the evidence, and is familiar with local conditions and prac-
tices. Therefore, it is in a more advantageous position than is al appellate court
to pass on the credibility of evidence and the contentions supported thereby 2
Secondly, the states have the right, and the duty, to admster their own laws
for the protection of their citizens.2 Review of state proceedings should be done
with the utmost discretion and respect for the states' decisions.25 In pursuance of
its duty to maintain constitutional protections, the Supreme Court must proceed
with caution so that these traditional functions, trial by jury and conscientious
state law enforcement, are not rendered impotent or meaningless.
Duane W Dresser
23 Stem v. New York, supra note 1, Haley v. Ohio, supra note 21.
24 Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910).25 Akms v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), Stem v. New York, supra note 1.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
